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Goodwin: Some Observations on Bailey v. Baker

COMMENTS
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON BAILEY v. BAKER*
C. E. GOODWIN*

One of the most controversial decisions handed down by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in recent, years is its
decision in Bailey v. Baker.1 It has evoked considerable informal
discussion and comment by members of the bar whose practice
includes certification of land titles, and is of interest to others for
considerations both practical and academic. While lawyers specializing in title certification are, for the most part, unequivocally in
disagreement with the holding of the court, it is observed that
there are many other lawyers who are equally firm in their
support thereof. The court itself was sharply and inexorably
divided. Two dissenting opinions were filed,2 the most vigorous
of which was upon rehearing by a member of the court who had,
upon the original hearing, voted with the majority, and who, in
his dissent, referred to the majority opinion on rehearing as
3
"unsound and wholly untenable."
On rehearing, a strong brief, exhaustive of the authorities, was
filed in support of the minority view by the Charleston Bar Association and various attorneys as amici curiae. In order, therefore, to
appraise intelligently the decision, under these circumstances, it is
necessary that both views be carefully considered. Positions so
unalterably opposed cannot be reconciled, but they can be understood. If the majority opinion is sound, it can be fortified through
understanding of the minority opinion. If it is "unsound" and
"untenable", an understanding of the infirmities that make it so
will speed the day when it may be overruled or neutralized by appropriate legislation.
The suit grows out of a tax sale to plaintiff Bailey in December, 1942 of certain property declared delinquent in 1941, which
property was formerly owned by one Caufield. Caufield had pur*Address delivered at the annual meeting of the West Virginia Bar
Association, at White Sulphur Springs, on September 24, 1952.
**Member of the Jackson County Bar.
168
S.E.2d 74, rehearing,70 S.E.2d 645 (W. Va. 1952).
2
Fox, J., at 79; Haymond, J., 70 S.E.2d 645, 647.
3
Haymond, J., dissenting, at 645, 647.
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chased the property as "Lots Nos. 1 and 2" in the year 1917, but
through a mistake of the assessor the lots were assessed as "Lot 182,
Block B, Homedale Addition", and taxes were paid thereon from
1918 through 1940. The error of the assessor may be explained
"by the use of the sign 'W' (ampersand) between the figures T and
'2', which appear on the blotter of the assessor's office for the year
1917, used in making the 1918 assessment, which rather plainly
resembles the figure '8'; . .. .,4
In compliance with Chapter 11-A, Article 3, of the Code, the
clerk of the county court of Kanawha County executed a deed on
June 1, 1944, conveying to plaintiff "the real estate so purchased,
situate in Charleston Rural District, Kanawha County, West Virginia, bounded and described as follows: " 'Being Lot 182, Block
B, Homedale Addition, Charleston Rural, Kanawha County, West
Virginia * * *.' " By deed dated May 11, 1950, defendant Baker,
with knowledge of the tax deed to Bailey, acquired his claim to
Lots 1 and 2 from the widow and devisee of Caufield. On the following day, Baker redeemed the lots from the state auditor, and
thereupon instituted an action of ejectment against Bailey to recover possession thereof. Thereafter Bailey instituted this cause
in chancery seeking to enjoin Baker from prosecuting the action
of ejectment and to compel the clerk of the county court of Kanawha County to correct the tax deed of June 1, 1944, so that the
property described therein would appear as "Lots I and 2" instead
of "Lot 182".
The supreme court reversed the ruling of the trial court and
held that the assessment to Caufield, from 1917 to 1941, of Lot 182
was a void assessment; that the tax deed to plaintiff Bailey was
likewise void; that Lots 1 and 2 were forfeited to the state for nonentry; and that Lots I and 2 were properly redeemed by defendant
Baker.
On rehearing, the court adhered to this decision, and in
further support thereof attached particular significance to the
fact that plaintiff Bailey accepted the tax deed that "described a
lot which was not in existence, and which only a cursory examination of the recorded plat, which was in the tax grantee's line of
468 S..2d 74, 76.
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title, and to which reference was made in the tax deed, would
5
have so disclosed."
The one issue decisive of the conflicting claims of the litigants
upon this record is whether the assessment of Lots 1 and 2 as "Lot
182" was void or merely irregular. As succinctly stated by Judge
Fox:
"Unless a court of equity may, in the circumstances of
this case, hold that the mistaken and improper assessment
which was clearly made in this case, nevertheless constituted
a legal assessment of Lots 1 and 2, as correctly described, then
the deed to the plaintiff is void."6
Two other propositions are discussed and resolved by the
court, neither of which is fundamental to the rationale of the decision, but both of which are complementary thereto. It was upon
the second of these propositions that the petition for rehearing
was primarily based. They are: (1) Do Sections 28 and 29,
Article 3, Chapter 11-A of the Code7 operate to validate the Bailey
deed? (2) Is the court bound by the decision announced in Point
6 of the syllabus in the case of Stiles v. Layman,8 in the absence of
an express holding here overruling the same?
Chapter 11-A, Article 4, Section 2 of the Code, provides that
every owner of land is charged with the duty of having such land
"entered for taxes on the land books of the appropriate county",
of having himself "charged with the taxes thereon", and is obligated to "pay the same'. Such section further provides that when
for any five successive years the land shall not have been so entered and charged, then by operation of law, without any proceedings therefor, it shall be forfeited to the state.9 The former owner
of any such real estate so forfeited to the state for non-entry, or any
other person entitled to pay the taxes thereon, may redeem such
real estate at any time prior to its certification by the auditor for
sale.10 The majority reasons that the assessment of Lot 182 was
not, in fact, an assessment of Lots 1 and 2 and therefore the latter,
not having been entered fgr taxes on the land books from 1918 to
970 S.E.2d 645, 646.
0 68 S.E. 2d 74, 80.
7 W. Va. Acts 1941, c. 117, art. 3, §§ 28, 29.
8 127 W. Va. 507, 33 S.E2d 601 (1945).
9 See also W. VA. CONsr. Art. XIII, § 6.
loW. VA. CODE c. I1A, art. 3, § 8 (Michie, 1949).
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1944, inclusive, were forfeited to the state. The defendant Baker,
as assignee of the former owner, qualified as a person entitled to
redeem under the statutory and constitutional provisions, and did
so within the time specified by statute, and thus is the true owner
of such real estate.
Judge Fox would have found for the plaintiff Bailey on equitable principles; i.e., that the mistake was acquiesced in by the state
and the property owner for more than twenty years; that the deed,
though containing an incorrect description, should, in a court of
equity, pass title to the lots'intended to be assessed; that the assertion by defendant Baker, as assignee of the property owner, of
a forfeiture of the property cannot be heard at this time because
such property owner himself could not have made the assertion
were he alive; and that any other ruling would be dangerous to
the security of land titles.
That the decision by the majority may be dangerous to the
security of land titles is also suggested in the dissenting opinion of
Judge Haymond. In this connection, he has the following to
say:
it will increasingly disturb the stability of the title
to a veritable multitude of parcels and tracts of land, which
have been assessed by an incorrect designation, subject those
lands to forfeiture, and cause confusion and uncertainty in
land titles which, until this decision, have been regarded as
good beyond serious question or successful attack.""1
The court concludes that the provisions of Sections 28 and 29,
Article 3, Chapter 11-A, are not applicable for the reasons that:
(1) Section 2812 specifically refers to the title to real estate vested
1170 S.E.2d 645, 6487

12 "Sec. 28.
Title Acquired by Individual Purchaser.-Whenever the purchaser of any real estate sold at a tax sale, his heirs or assigns, shall have
obtained a deed for such real estate from the clerk of the county court or from
a commissioner appointed to make the deed, he or they shall thereby acquire
all such right, title and interest, in and to the real estate, as was, at the time
of the execution and delivery of the deed, vested in or held by any person who
was entitled to redeem, unless such person is one who, being required
by law to have his interest separately assessed and taxed, has done so
and has paid all the taxes due thereon, or unless the rights of such person are
expressly saved by the provisions of sections sixteen, thirty, thirty-one, thirtytwo or thirty-five, [§§ 999 (101), 999 (115), 999 (116), 999(117) or 999 (120)] of
this article. The tax deed shall be conclusive evidence of the acquisition of such
title. The title so acquired shall relate back to January first of the year in
which the taxes, for nonpayment of which the real estate was sold, were
assessed."
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in or held by the person who was entitled to redeem. In this case,
the property which the owner was entitled to redeem was Lots 1
and 2 and not Lot 182. (2) There is no issue of any irregularity,
error or mistake in respect to any step in the procedure leading up
to and including delivery of the tax deed to bring the case within
the language of Section 29;13 rather, the irregularity or mistake
concerns a discrepancy in the identity of the property.
The court reviewed its several former decisions involving a
similar question and, with the exception of Hardman v. Ward,1 4
endeavored to distinguish each on its facts from the case at bar.
With reference to the cases of Cain v. Fisher,5 Robey v. Wilson,16
and Leach v. Weaver,'7 it was found that there was an incorrect
tax assessment in each, but that such improper assessment related
to the quantity of land charged and not the identity of the property.
The case of Stiles v. Layman' was endeavored to be distinguished on the ground that there the property substituted for the
lot to be charged was "actually in existence". In that case, the
owner of a town lot, which was correctly designated as Lot 93,
through clerical error, was charged with Lot 92. Nevertheless, the
court held that inasmuch as the owner had paid all state taxes
levied under such erroneous designation, he paid "all state taxes
charged or chargeable" on Lot 93, within the meaning of the Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, thereby preventing forfeiture.
In further support of its decision, the court takes the position
that the case of Hardman v. Ward is controlling. Syllabus 2 of
that case is as follows:

Effect of Irregularity on Title Acquired by Purchaser.-No
13 "Sec. 29.
irregularity, error or mistake in respect to any step in the procedure leading up
to and including delivery of the tax deed shall invalidate the title acquired by
the purchaser unless such irregularity, error or mistake is,by the provisions of
sections sixteen, thirty, thirty-one or thirty-two [§§ 999 (101), 999 (115), 999 (116)
or 999(117)] of this article, expressly made ground for instituting a suit to set
aside the sale or the deed.
"This and the preceding section are enacted in furtherance of the purpose
and policy set forth in section one [§ 999 (86)] of this article."
14 67 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1951).
i5 57 W. Va. 492, 50 S.E. 752 (1905).
16 84 W. Va. 738, 101 S.E 151 (1919).
'7 89 W. Va. 49, 108 S.E. 494 (1921).
's 127 W. Va. 507, 33 S.E.2d 601 (1945).
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"A tax sale based upon an invalid assessment is void and
a deed made by the county clerk to a tax purchaser pursuant
to such sale constitutes a cloud on the owner's title which the
latter has a right to have removed in a court of equity."
In that case, the land was returned delinquent for taxes unpaid
thereon for the year 1931 and sold to the state. Thereafter, and
in the year 1938, the property was again placed on the land books
in the appropriate county, with title still in the state. The court
ruled, in effect, that the assessment in 1938 was invalid, title thereto being in the state.
The dissenting opinion filed by Judge Fox and endorsed on
rehearing by Judge Haymond acknowledges that the cases of Cain
v. Fisher, Robey v. Wilson and Leach v. Weaver are distinguishable from the case at bar, but adds that the decisions rendered
therein "sustain the general principle that a clerical mistake, or
even more serious errors, will not be allowed to interfere with the
validity of a tax deed otherwise legal and valid."' "
The dissenting opinion filed by Judge Haymond, in addition
to the reasons assigned by Judge Fox, disagrees with the majority
view on the ground that there is no "material distinction" between the erroneous assessment in Stiles v. Layman and the equally
erroneous assessment in the Bailey case. With reference to Point
6 of the syllabus of the Stiles case, Judge Haymond said:
"The majority opinion now filed does not expressly overrule this sound pronouncement, though the present holding
does so in effect, but instead engages in a labored and, I think,
an unsuccessful effort to distinguish it from the situation presented in the case at bar. I can see no valid or material distinction between the erroneous assessment of Lot No. 93, by
the designation of Lot No. 92, in the Stiles case, and the instant equally erroneous assessment of Lots 1 and 2 by the
designation of Lot No. 182 . . .,
It cannot be denied that there is a recognizable distinction
between an assessment of property involving a mistake as to the
quantity of land charged and one involving a mistake as to the
identity of the property. Reasonable minds, however, will differ
as to the soundness of making such distinction the ground upon
19 68 S.E.2d 74, 80 (W. Va. 1952).
20 70 S.E2d 645, 647 (W. Va. 1952).
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which to arrive at different results. Where the mistake is as to
quantity, there is little question but that the particular property
owned by the taxpayer is being charged, even though under an
improper and perhaps inadequate assessment. In the case of a
mistake as to the identity of the property, there may be doubt that
the particular property intended to be charged is being assessed
at all; in this situation, it is only through the adoption of a different or substitute description that the taxpayer can be said to have
complied with the constitutional and statutory duty of having his
land "entered for taxes on the land books of the appropriate
county".1 The court, speaking through Judge Riley, dearly points
out the distinction between the two classes of cases and thereby
justifies its apparent departure from the articulate reasoning of
certain of its former decisions. The distinction made by the court
between the case of Stiles v. Layman and the Bailey case is, however, certainly more finely drawn, and is, in the opinion of the
writer, superficial rather than substantial. The only discernible
difference between the comparable facts of the Stiles and Bailey
cases is that in the former, the lot mistakenly substituted on the
land books for the property intended to be charged was "in existence", whereas in the latter, there was no such lot as Lot 182.
In the Stiles case, the court seems to be willing to recognize the
fact of a substituted description, i.e., Lot 92 for Lot 93, but in the
Bailey case is unwilling to do so because of the nonexistence of the
property. Both cases concern a mistake in the identity of the property charged and it is not perceived how or in what manner the
existence or nonexistence of the property mistakenly assessed does
or should affect the validity of the assessment, if the landowner
pays all taxes chargeable thereon in good faith. If it is considered
sound and of sufficient importance, under the circumstances, to
make the distinction between a mistake as to quantity and one as
to identity of property the basis for arriving at different conclusions, it would seem desirable not to labor it further. To compromise or further qualify the distinction on the basis of existence
or nonexistence of the property mistakenly identified on the land
books not only throws doubt upon its soundness but results in
considerable confusion in the law. In this connection, it is sug21 W. VA. CODE

c. IIA, art. 4, § 2 (Michie, 1949); W. VA. CONST. Art. XIII,
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gested that it would have been better had the court specifically
overruled the Stiles case. If the reasoning of the court in the
Bailey case is fundamentally sound, it is submitted that the result
reached in the Stiles case conflicts therewith, and there should be
no reluctance in overruling the latter decision.
On the other hand, an analysis of the equities involved, as
well as a consideration of the adverse effect of the decision upon
the stability of land titles, has convinced the writer that the distinctions made in the Bailey case are erroneous.
The general law on this subject, followed in other jurisdictions, is stated as follows:
"The few cases passing on the question seem to be agreed
that if a landowner pays a tax believing in good faith that it
is assessed against his land, though that land is not accurately
described in the assessment, the payment discharges from
the
22
tax the land in exoneration of which it is intended.1
It is noted that the curative elements mentioned in the above
quotation are (a) good faith on the part of the taxpayer, and (b)
the payment of the taxes. It is not disputed in the Bailey case
that the taxpayer Caufield paid taxes on Lot 182 in good faith,
thinking that he was paying taxes on the property which he, in
fact, owned. The state received such taxes for a period of over
twenty years. The taxpayer and the state thus adopted the erroneous description, i.e., "Lot 182", for the true description of the
property. If the delinquency and sale had occurred during the
lifetime of Caufield, certainly he could not be heard to complain
of the sale, inasmuch as he had theretofore paid his taxes under
such adopted description. He could not disavow the effect of his
long-continued payment of taxes under the adopted description
and at the same time claim a benefit through his failure to have
the land properly assessed.
That the decision in the Bailey case will disturb the stability
of land titles cannot be gainsaid. A cursory examination of the
land books of the several counties in the state will doubtless disclose hundreds - if not thousands - of assessments which are improper by reason of an incorrect description. Under this decision,
itsuch erroneous assessments have been carried for a period of
2? 23 A.L.R. 79 (1923).
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five years without correction, the land is thereupon forfeited to
the state of West Virginia for non-entry and must be redeemed
by the taxpayer. The unhappy result is that thousands of taxpayers who have for many years felt secure in the soundness of their
property titles now find themselves divested thereof by a court
decision which results in such titles being transferred to the state
of West Virginia by operation of law.
It should also be remembered that the decision in the Bailey
case emanated from a court of equity. In speaking to lawyers, it
is unnecessary to do more than to refer to the underlying principle
that courts of equity are remedial and were created to ameliorate
the harsh and unyielding rules of the common law.
With all deference to the opinion of the court, and giving due
consideration to the dissenting opinions, the writer's conclusions
may be stated briefly as follows:
In the Bailey case, the erroneous assessment of Lots 1 &z2 as
"Lot 182", through a clerical error of the assessor, was merely irregular and not void. The factual distinction which the court
makes between a mistake as to quantity and one as to the identity
of the property is not considered sufficient grounds upon which to
arrive at different results. In fact, there was no mistake in the
identity of the property in the Bailey case but merely an error in
the description, which was adopted and acted upon by both the
taxing authority and the taxpayer for a period in excess of twenty
years; and to base an attempted further distinction upon the existence or nonexistence of the property substituted on the land
books is to resort to reasoning so finely drawn as to be almost
illusory.
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